AQA A Level Law: The Nature of Law and the English Legal System — Practice Questions

These are original questions written for Marlbridge, for revision and practice on this content. They are not reproduced past-paper questions, and they do not replicate the exam’s exact structure, question count or mark tariffs — examination boards hold copyright in their own papers. Use these alongside the official past papers available free from your board.

Related: The Nature of Law revision notes

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Section A

1. Distinguish between legal rules and moral rules, giving three points of difference. [6]

2. State the specification’s three elements of the rule of law. [3]

Section B

3. Explain the Hart–Devlin debate on the enforcement of morality, and give one example of the law reflecting a change in moral attitudes. [8]

4. Explain the relationship between law and morality, including the extent to which the law should enforce moral values in a pluralist society. [8]

5. Explain three theories of justice and apply each briefly to the sentencing of offenders. [9]

6. Evaluate the extent to which the English legal system achieves access to justice. [15]

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Answers

1. Origin — legal rules are created by a formal, identifiable process such as an Act of Parliament or a court decision; moral rules evolve gradually within a society or community with no formal starting point [1] [1]. Enforcement — legal rules are enforced by the courts with defined sanctions; moral rules are enforced only by social pressure, disapproval or conscience [1] [1]. Change — a legal rule can be changed instantly by legislation; moral rules change slowly and are often disputed within the same society [1] [1]. (Also accept: legal rules bind everyone in the jurisdiction; moral rules may bind only a group.)

2. No person shall be sanctioned except in accordance with the law [1]; equality before the law, with everyone subject to the same law applied by the same courts [1]; fairness and clarity in how the law operates [1]. (Dicey’s own formulation — no punishment except for a breach of law established in the ordinary courts, equality before the law, and rights secured through court decisions rather than a written constitution — is useful background but is not how the specification itself states the doctrine.)

3. The debate followed the Wolfenden Report (1957), which recommended decriminalising homosexual acts between consenting adults in private [1]. Devlin argued that a shared morality is the cement of society, so the law is entitled to enforce it; conduct that the reasonable person would regard with “intolerance, indignation and disgust” may be punished even if it harms no one else [1] [1]. Hart, drawing on Mill’s harm principle, argued the law should only intervene to prevent harm to others; enforcing morality restricts individual liberty, and the “shared morality” Devlin assumed does not exist in a pluralist society [1] [1]. Example: the decriminalisation of homosexual acts by the Sexual Offences Act 1967, the later equalisation of the age of consent, and the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 — which made same-sex marriage lawful from its commencement on 13 March 2014 — show the law following changing moral attitudes rather than leading them [1] [1] [1].

4. Law and morality overlap substantially in some areas (e.g. serious violence, dishonesty) but diverge in others (e.g. many regulatory or technical offences), so the two are related but distinct systems of rules [1] [1]. In a pluralist society, where moral views on issues such as assisted dying or drug use genuinely differ, enforcing one group’s morality through law risks restricting individual liberty without the shared consensus Devlin’s argument assumes; but a wholly amoral law also risks legitimising serious harm, which is why the law does enforce a moral floor in areas such as violence and dishonesty even in a pluralist society [1] [1]. Criticism of natural law: there is no agreement on what the higher law requires, so it provides no workable test, and it may encourage disobedience to validly enacted law [1] [1]. Criticism of positivism: it would require obedience to grossly unjust laws — as the Nuremberg trials illustrated, where “I was following the law” was rejected as a defence [1] [1].

5. Any three, 3 marks each: Distributive justice (Aristotle) — concerned with the fair allocation of benefits and burdens according to merit; in sentencing, this supports proportionality — the punishment should fit the seriousness of the offence and the culpability of the offender [1] [1] [1]. Corrective (retributive) justice — wrongdoing must be put right and the offender given their just deserts; in sentencing, this justifies punishment for its own sake and the requirement of compensation to the victim [1] [1] [1]. Utilitarian justice (Bentham) — justice is what produces the greatest happiness of the greatest number; in sentencing, this justifies punishment only where it produces deterrence, protection of the public or rehabilitation, and would permit a harsher-than-deserved sentence if it deterred others [1] [1] [1]. Rawls’s theory of justice — principles chosen behind a veil of ignorance, permitting inequality only where it benefits the least advantaged; in sentencing, this supports mitigation for disadvantaged backgrounds and the equal treatment of all defendants [1] [1] [1].

6. Arguments that access is achieved: the right to a fair trial is protected by Article 6 ECHR and enforced through the Human Rights Act [1]; duty solicitors are available free at police stations regardless of means [1]; conditional fee agreements allow claimants to bring civil actions without upfront cost [1]; tribunals, the small claims track and ombudsman schemes provide cheaper, quicker and less formal routes than full litigation [1]; legal aid remains available for the most serious criminal cases and for cases involving liberty or children [1]. Arguments that it is not: LASPO 2012 removed legal aid from most civil matters — housing, welfare, employment, most family law — so many people cannot obtain advice at all [1] [1]; the means and merits tests are stringent, leaving a large group who earn too much for aid but too little to pay [1]; the rise in litigants in person lengthens hearings and disadvantages those without representation against a represented opponent [1]; court closures and fee increases have created geographical and financial barriers [1]; conditional fee agreements are only viable for cases likely to win and to yield damages, so meritorious but low-value claims go unpursued [1]. Judgement: access to justice is substantially protected in criminal cases involving liberty but has been significantly narrowed in civil and family matters since 2012 [1] [1]. Formal legal rights are of limited value without the practical means to enforce them, so the system delivers formal but not substantive equality before the law for many people [1] [1].

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Where marks are usually lost

• Treating Hart and Devlin as agreeing about the harm principle.
• Explaining theories of justice without applying them.
• Listing legal aid changes without evaluating their effect.
• Confusing the rule of law with parliamentary supremacy.