O Level History: The Nineteenth Century — Practice Questions

These are original questions written for Marlbridge, for revision and practice on this content. They are not reproduced past-paper questions. The wording and exact sources below are invented for practice purposes, but the structure follows the syllabus’s own: on Paper 1, Core Content questions are three-part structured essays, split (a), (b), (c); on Paper 2, one document question with up to seven sources is set on a single prescribed Core Content topic. Cambridge International holds copyright in its own papers; use these alongside the official past papers available through your school or Cambridge directly.

Related: The Nineteenth Century revision notes

---

Paper 1 style: Structured Questions (Section A — Core Content)

On the real paper, Section A offers 8 questions (4 on this option, 4 on the Twentieth Century option) and candidates answer two, plus one further question from Section B on a Depth Study (not covered by this Core Content resource — see the Depth Studies practice for that style). Practise any two of the four questions below; each is worth 20 marks, split across three parts.

Question 1: The Vienna Settlement, 1815

(a) Describe the aims of the Congress of Vienna (1815). [4]

(b) Explain how the settlement of 1815 attempted to prevent future French aggression. [6]

(c) ‘Containing France was the most important aim of the Congress of Vienna.’ How far do you agree? [10]

Worked answer

(a) To restore legitimate rulers deposed by Napoleon; to contain France and prevent any future bid for domination; to establish a balance of power among the great powers so that no one state could dominate Europe. [4]

(b) France was surrounded by strengthened neighbours: the Netherlands was enlarged by the addition of Belgium, and Prussia was given the Rhineland, placing a major power directly on France’s eastern frontier; Piedmont was strengthened by the addition of Genoa in the south. The powers also agreed the Quadruple Alliance and the Congress System, committing to meet regularly and act together against any renewed French aggression. [6]

(c) For: the specific territorial measures — strengthening the Netherlands, Prussia and Piedmont on France’s borders, and the Quadruple Alliance’s ongoing commitment to act together — were all designed with the single, explicit purpose of preventing a repeat of French expansion under a future Napoleon, showing containment was the practical priority the other powers acted on. Against: restoring legitimate rulers mattered just as much to the conservative powers, since a settlement that merely contained France’s borders while leaving revolutionary or Napoleonic-sympathising regimes in place elsewhere would have left the underlying threat unaddressed; and the balance-of-power principle was what made the whole settlement durable, since containing France through territorial measures alone, without a wider balance among Austria, Prussia, Russia and Britain, could have simply created a new imbalance and a new source of future conflict. Judgement: containing France explains the most visible and specific measures, but the balance-of-power principle was what the settlement’s architects (especially Britain’s Castlereagh) treated as the deeper, longer-term goal — the anti-French measures were the immediate application of that principle rather than a separate or more important aim in their own right. [10] (Marks for weighing containment against the settlement’s other aims, and reaching a supported judgement.)

Question 2: The Unification of Italy

(a) Describe three obstacles to Italian unification that existed before 1859. [4]

(b) Explain the roles of Cavour and Garibaldi in the unification of Italy. [6]

(c) ‘The failure of the 1848 revolutions in Italy shows that unification could only ever be achieved through diplomacy and war, not popular uprising.’ How far do you agree? [10]

Worked answer

(a) Any three: Austrian domination — Austria held Lombardy and Venetia directly and controlled the rulers of the central duchies, and Metternich was determined to suppress any nationalist movement. Division among the nationalists — Mazzini wanted a united republic, Gioberti a federation under the Pope, and others a kingdom under Piedmont, so they could not agree on a single goal. The Papacy — the Pope ruled the Papal States across the centre of Italy and would not surrender temporal power, and Catholic France would defend him. [4]

(b) Cavour, Prime Minister of Piedmont, pursued unification through diplomacy and economic modernisation: he built up Piedmont’s army, railways and finances, and at Plombières (1858) secured a secret alliance with Napoleon III, promising Nice and Savoy for French help against Austria. Garibaldi led the Expedition of the Thousand in 1860, conquering Sicily and then Naples, and handed his conquests to Victor Emmanuel rather than declaring a republic, allowing unification to proceed under a single crown. [6]

(c) For: the 1848–49 revolutions in Italy failed for reasons that a later, more disciplined strategy specifically avoided — the revolutionaries split between liberals wanting moderate change and radicals wanting more sweeping change, the middle classes withdrew their support once property and order seemed threatened, and the conservative powers (above all Austria) kept control of their armies throughout and used them to restore the old order; Cavour and Garibaldi’s later success came only once diplomacy (securing French support so Austria could not simply reimpose control) and organised military force were used instead of relying on popular uprising alone. Against: popular uprising was not simply replaced by diplomacy and war — Garibaldi’s Expedition of the Thousand was itself a form of popular, volunteer-led action rather than a state-directed war, and it succeeded partly because it drew on genuine local support in Sicily and Naples; diplomacy and war created the conditions (a secure northern kingdom, Austria’s exclusion) in which a popular-style expedition could finally succeed, rather than uprising being abandoned altogether. Judgement: the 1848 failures showed that popular uprising alone, without a secure state behind it and without neutralising the other great powers, could not succeed against Austria’s army — but Garibaldi’s 1860 campaign shows that popular action still had a genuine role once Cavour’s diplomacy had first removed the conditions that had doomed it in 1848–49. [10] (Marks for using 1848’s specific failures as evidence, and reaching a supported judgement rather than an unqualified claim.)

Question 3: The Eastern Question

(a) Describe what is meant by the “Eastern Question”. [4]

(b) Explain two reasons why the great powers were concerned with the decline of the Ottoman Empire. [6]

(c) ‘Russia’s ambitions were the most significant reason the great powers were concerned about Ottoman decline.’ How far do you agree? [10]

Worked answer

(a) The “Eastern Question” was the problem of what would happen to the territories of the declining Ottoman Empire, and which powers would gain from its collapse. [4]

(b) Any two: Russia sought access to the Mediterranean through the Straits and posed as the protector of Ottoman Christians, so Ottoman collapse would give her a decisive strategic gain. Britain wanted to prevent Russian expansion towards the Mediterranean and the route to India, so she generally propped up the Ottoman Empire despite its misgovernment. [6]

(c) For: Russia’s specific, concrete ambitions — gaining direct access to the Mediterranean through the Straits, and using her claimed role as protector of Ottoman Christians as a pretext for intervention — gave her the clearest and most immediate incentive to want Ottoman collapse, and it was precisely the prospect of Russian gain that drove the other powers’ policies in response. Against: Britain’s concern (protecting the route to India from Russian expansion) and Austria-Hungary’s concern (fearing that Balkan nationalism, encouraged by Ottoman retreat, would spread to her own Slav subjects and break up the Habsburg Empire) were not simply secondary reactions to Russia — each power had its own independent stake in the region’s future regardless of what Russia did. Judgement: Russia’s ambitions were the single most direct threat and therefore the most immediate trigger for other powers’ concern, but describing them as the “most significant reason” overall understates how much Britain’s and Austria-Hungary’s own separate interests shaped their policies — the Eastern Question is better understood as a genuine multi-power rivalry than as one power’s ambitions with the others simply reacting. [10] (Marks for weighing Russia’s ambitions against the other powers’ independent concerns, and reaching a supported judgement.)

Question 4: European Imperialism in Africa

(a) Describe three motives for European imperialism in Africa in the later nineteenth century. [4]

(b) Explain how economic motives drove European imperialism in Africa. [6]

(c) ‘Economic motives were more important than strategic or ideological motives in driving European imperialism in Africa.’ How far do you agree? [10]

Worked answer

(a) Any three: economic motives — the search for raw materials and for markets for manufactured goods. Strategic motives — control of routes such as the Suez Canal and the Cape, and of coaling stations for naval power. National prestige and rivalry — colonies were a mark of great-power status, and each power seized territory to deny it to a rival. [4]

(b) European industrial economies needed reliable sources of raw materials such as rubber, cotton and minerals to feed their factories, and needed new markets for the manufactured goods those factories produced, especially as European markets became increasingly saturated; African territory offered both, and formal colonial control was seen as a way to secure guaranteed access to both resources and markets rather than relying on open trade that a rival power might disrupt. [6]

(c) For economic motives: the scale and pace of the “scramble” for Africa closely tracked industrial powers’ need for raw materials and new markets, and colonial administrations were frequently organised specifically around resource extraction, suggesting economic motives were the underlying driver that made imperial expansion worth its cost. Against: strategic motives were sometimes decisive on their own — Britain’s control of Egypt and the Suez Canal was driven overwhelmingly by the need to protect the route to India, a strategic rather than primarily economic consideration; and national prestige and rivalry meant that powers sometimes seized territory of limited economic value specifically to deny it to a rival or to satisfy domestic public opinion, which cannot be explained by economic motives alone. Judgement: economic motives provide the broadest explanation for why European industrial powers were interested in Africa at all, but strategic and prestige motives frequently explain the specific choices of which territories were seized and when, so treating economic motives as simply “more important” understates how often strategic and prestige considerations drove individual decisions even where the underlying interest in Africa was economic in origin. [10] (Marks for weighing economic against strategic and ideological motives with specific evidence, and reaching a supported judgement.)

---

Paper 2 style: Document Question (one question, five parts, 40 marks)

The real Paper 2 sets one document question, on a single prescribed Core Content topic, with up to seven sources. This illustrative question uses three.

Illustrative topic: The Expedition of the Thousand, 1860

Source A — from a letter by one of Garibaldi’s volunteers, 1860: “We landed with barely a thousand men and old muskets, yet Sicilians joined us by the thousand within days. The Bourbon garrisons melted away almost without a fight.”

Source B — from a report by a Piedmontese official to Cavour, 1860: “Garibaldi’s success embarrasses us as much as it helps us. If he presses on to Rome, he risks war with France that we cannot afford and did not choose.”

Source C — from a modern historian: “Cavour’s decision to send Piedmontese troops south was as much about controlling Garibaldi as about supporting him.”

(a) According to Source A, how did the Sicilians respond to Garibaldi’s landing? [4]

(b) Why do you think the Piedmontese official in Source B was worried about Garibaldi’s success? [6]

(c) How far do Sources A and B agree about the nature of Garibaldi’s campaign? [8]

(d) How useful is Source C to a historian studying Cavour’s motives in 1860? [7]

(e) ‘Garibaldi’s campaign succeeded because of popular support rather than military strength.’ How far do the sources support this view? [15]

Worked answer

(a) According to Source A, Sicilians joined Garibaldi’s forces by the thousand within days of the landing, and the Bourbon garrisons largely withdrew without significant resistance. [4]

(b) The Piedmontese official was worried because Garibaldi’s continued advance risked provoking a war with France, which supported the Pope’s control of Rome — a war that Piedmont had not chosen and could not necessarily afford, given that Piedmont’s own strategy depended on French goodwill (secured at Plombières) rather than French hostility; Garibaldi’s independent, popular momentum threatened to drag Piedmont into a conflict on a timetable Cavour did not control. [6]

(c) The two sources broadly agree that Garibaldi’s campaign was moving fast and gaining ground, but they frame this very differently: Source A, from a participant, presents the rapid Sicilian support and the garrisons’ collapse as evidence of the campaign’s popular, almost unstoppable momentum, while Source B, from a Piedmontese official, treats that same momentum as a source of anxiety and a problem to be managed rather than celebrated. Their agreement is limited to the underlying facts of rapid success; they diverge entirely in how that success should be interpreted and responded to. [8]

(d) Source C is useful because it offers a historian’s considered judgement about Cavour’s underlying motive (control as much as support), which goes beyond what either Source A or B states directly and helps explain why Piedmont later sent troops south; its usefulness is limited by its brevity and by being a secondary interpretation rather than direct evidence, so a historian would want to check it against primary sources such as Cavour’s own correspondence rather than accepting the claim on its own. [7]

(e) Source A directly supports the claim, presenting Sicilian popular support and the collapse of Bourbon resistance — rather than any Piedmontese or Garibaldian military superiority — as the reason the landing succeeded so quickly. Source B is consistent with this reading: the official’s anxiety is specifically about the popular momentum of Garibaldi’s campaign, not about any conventional military strength Piedmont itself contributed, since at this point Piedmont’s own army had not yet joined the campaign. Source C adds a complication rather than a direct answer, since it concerns Cavour’s later motives rather than the initial cause of Garibaldi’s success, though it indirectly supports the claim by implying Piedmont’s formal military involvement came only after the popular campaign had already succeeded, as a controlling response to it rather than its cause. A well-supported judgement should conclude that the sources, taken together, support the view that popular support was the decisive factor in Garibaldi’s initial success in Sicily and Naples, while Piedmont’s military strength became important only afterwards, in securing and managing what Garibaldi’s popular campaign had already achieved. [15] (Marks for accurate use of all three sources with attention to provenance, own knowledge, and a sustained judgement.)

---

Where marks are usually lost

• Describing events on the (c) parts rather than sustaining a judgement against the specific claim in the question.
• On the document question, repeating what a source says without weighing its provenance (who wrote it, when, and why).
• Giving Garibaldi, or popular uprising generally, sole credit for unification without weighing Cavour’s diplomacy alongside it.
• Explaining the Eastern Question without weighing each power’s own, independent strategic interests.

Official syllabus

Cambridge O Level History (2147) syllabus for examination in 2024, 2025 and 2026, Core Content Option A (“The Nineteenth Century”) and the assessment overview (Paper 1: Structured Questions, three-part essays, 60 marks; Paper 2: Document Question, five parts, up to seven sources, 40 marks) — cambridgeinternational.org. The exact mark split within each part is set by Cambridge’s own question papers and mark schemes each series and is not published in the syllabus itself; the splits above are illustrative only. Verified 2026-09-11.