Cambridge A-Level Law: Law of Contract — Practice Questions (9084)

These practice questions cover all of Topic 3 Law of contract in Cambridge International A Level Law (9084): formation, contents, discharge and remedies. Paper 3 rewards answers that state the rule, support it with a case or statutory section, apply it to the facts and evaluate it. Each question is followed by indicative content of the kind a mark scheme credits.

These are original questions written for Marlbridge, for revision and practice on this content. They are not reproduced past-paper questions, and they do not replicate the exam’s exact structure, question count or mark tariffs — Cambridge holds copyright in its own papers. Use these alongside the official past papers available through your school or Cambridge’s own resources.

Related: Law of contract study guide and revision notes.

Section A - scenario questions (Paper 3 style)

1. Tomas, aged 17, is a trainee chef. On 3 May he emailed Grillworks Ltd: “I will buy your professional knife set for 900 pounds.” Grillworks replied: “We accept, but delivery will cost an extra 40 pounds.” Tomas did not reply. On 6 May Grillworks’s manager heard from another customer that Tomas had found a cheaper set and posted a letter withdrawing its reply. On 7 May Tomas posted a letter agreeing to pay the delivery charge. Grillworks received both letters on 8 May. Tomas has since refused to pay, saying he is a minor. His uncle had signed a guarantee of Tomas’s debts to Grillworks.

Advise Grillworks Ltd whether it has a contract with Tomas that it can enforce. [25]

2. Fernhill Hotel booked the Saltmarsh Band to play at a wedding on 14 June for 3,000 pounds, paying a 1,000 pound deposit. The contract stated “the band shall consist of the four named members”. On 10 June the lead singer was admitted to hospital and the band offered to perform with a replacement. Fernhill refused, cancelled the booking and hired another band for 3,600 pounds. Separately, Fernhill had bought a dishwasher from Kleen Ltd, a business supplier. Kleen’s standard terms, printed on the back of the delivery note handed over after installation, excluded “all liability for loss howsoever caused”. The dishwasher leaked and damaged the kitchen floor.

Advise Fernhill Hotel of its rights and remedies. [25]

Section B - essay questions (Paper 3 style)

3. “The doctrine of consideration no longer serves a useful purpose and should be abolished.” Assess the validity of this statement. [25]

4. Evaluate the extent to which the Consumer Rights Act 2015 gives consumers effective protection against exemption clauses and unfair terms. [25]

5. “Damages are an adequate remedy in almost every breach of contract; equitable remedies are rarely needed.” Discuss. [25]

Indicative answers

1. Grillworks v Tomas [25]

• Offer (3.1.2): Tomas’s email is a clear statement of willingness to be bound on stated terms: an offer, not an invitation to treat.
• Counter-offer: Grillworks’s reply adds a new term (40 pounds delivery). It is not an unconditional acceptance but a counter-offer which destroys Tomas’s offer (Hyde v Wrench, 1840). It is more than a request for information (contrast Stevenson, Jaques v McLean, 1880).
• Revocation: an offer may be withdrawn before acceptance, but revocation must be communicated. Hearing from a customer is not revocation by Grillworks: Dickinson v Dodds (1876) concerned an offeree learning of the offeror’s withdrawal from a reliable third party, which is not this situation. The revocation letter takes effect only on receipt (Byrne v Van Tienhoven, 1880), on 8 May.
• Acceptance: Tomas’s letter of 7 May accepts the counter-offer. The postal rule applies if post was a reasonable means of acceptance (Adams v Lindsell, 1818), so acceptance was complete on posting on 7 May, before the revocation arrived. A contract was formed at 940 pounds. Evaluation: the postal rule can favour the offeree arbitrarily, and courts may exclude it where it would produce manifest inconvenience (Holwell Securities v Hughes, 1974), but on these facts it is likely to apply.
• Intention and consideration: a commercial sale, so intention is presumed; the price is consideration.
• Capacity (3.1.5): Tomas is a minor. He is bound to pay a reasonable price for necessaries (Sale of Goods Act 1979, s3). A trainee chef may need knives for his work, but the court asks whether the goods suit his condition in life and whether he already had adequate supplies (Nash v Inman, 1908). A 900 pound professional set may be held a luxury rather than a necessary. If it is not a necessary, the contract cannot be enforced against him.
• Remedies against minors: the Minors’ Contracts Act 1987 s2 means the uncle’s guarantee is enforceable even though the contract is unenforceable against Tomas. Under s3, if the knives were delivered, the court may order Tomas to return them if just and equitable. Equity will not order him to repay money as such (Leslie v Sheill, 1914).
• Conclusion: a contract was formed on 7 May. Grillworks can recover from Tomas only if the set is a necessary; otherwise it should sue the uncle under s2 or seek return of the goods under s3.
• Credit evaluation of the policy of protecting minors against the unfairness to traders, and the possible reform of lowering the age of contractual capacity.

2. Fernhill Hotel [25]

• Discharge by performance (3.3.1): the contract named four members, so performance by a substitute is not exact performance. Vicarious performance is allowed only where personal skill is not essential (British Waggon Co v Lea, 1880); a band’s named singer is personal.
• Frustration (3.3.3): illness of a key performer can frustrate a contract for personal services (Robinson v Davison, 1871; Condor v Baron Knights, 1966). The illness was not self-induced or foreseen. If frustrated, the contract ended automatically on 10 June and Fernhill’s refusal is not a breach.
• Effect: under the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 s1(2), the 1,000 pound deposit is recoverable, but the court may let the band keep some of it to cover expenses already incurred (Gamerco v ICM/Fair Warning, 1995). The extra 600 pounds for the new band is not recoverable, because there was no breach.
• Alternative argument: if the court found the band could have performed acceptably with a substitute (for example, if the term was not of the essence), the band’s failure to supply the named line-up would be a breach; Fernhill could then claim the extra 600 pounds as cost of cover, subject to mitigation.
• Dishwasher - implied terms: this is a business-to-business sale, so the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (not the CRA 2015) implies satisfactory quality; a leaking dishwasher breaches it.
• Exemption clause - incorporation: terms must be notified before or at the time of contracting (Olley v Marlborough Court, 1949). A delivery note handed over after installation is too late and is probably not a contractual document (Chapelton v Barry UDC, 1940). The clause is not incorporated.
• Construction and UCTA 1977: even if incorporated, ambiguity is read contra proferentem. Under UCTA s2(2) and s3, exclusion of liability for property damage must satisfy the s11 reasonableness test, judged at the time of contracting (George Mitchell v Finney Lock Seeds, 1983); a blanket exclusion by a supplier with stronger bargaining power is unlikely to pass.
• Remedy: damages for the floor, which is a natural consequence of the breach (Hadley v Baxendale, 1854, first limb).

3. Consideration essay [25]

• AO1: definition (Currie v Misa, 1875); sufficiency not adequacy (Chappell v Nestle, 1960); past consideration (Re McArdle, 1951; Lampleigh v Brathwait, 1615); existing duties (Stilk v Myrick, 1809; Williams v Roffey, 1991); part payment (Foakes v Beer, 1884); promissory estoppel (High Trees, 1947).
• For abolition: the rules are technical and riddled with exceptions; Roffey’s “practical benefit” sits uneasily with Foakes v Beer, which still binds courts on debts (the Supreme Court in Rock Advertising v MWB, 2018, declined to reconsider it); a nominal peppercorn satisfies the rule, so it is a formality rather than a test of fairness; other systems enforce serious promises without it.
• Against abolition: it marks the line between bargains and gratuitous promises; it gives certainty; the exceptions show the courts can adapt it; promissory estoppel and economic duress already deal with the unfair cases.
• Conclusion: a reasoned view, such as reform of the part-payment rule rather than abolition.

4. CRA 2015 essay [25]

• AO1: scope - trader and consumer contracts (s61, definitions in s2); s31 (goods) and s57 (services) prevent exclusion of the statutory rights in s9-s11 and s49; s65 bars exclusion for negligent death or personal injury; s62 unfair terms are not binding on the consumer; s68 requires transparency.
• Effectiveness: protection is automatic - a clause that tries to exclude s9 is simply not binding; the fairness test catches hidden or one-sided terms; consumers keep tiered remedies (s20, s22, s23, s24). Common-law incorporation rules (Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking, 1971; Interfoto, 1989) still apply alongside.
• Limits: consumers rarely litigate over small sums; the fairness test is open-textured, so outcomes are uncertain; consumers may not know that an unfair term is not binding on them, so traders can still rely on such terms in practice.
• Conclusion: the Act is a real improvement in consolidating and simplifying the law, but its effectiveness depends on awareness and access to justice.

5. Remedies essay [25]

• Damages (3.4.1): purpose of expectation damages (Robinson v Harman, 1848); reliance (Anglia TV v Reed, 1972); non-pecuniary loss (Jarvis v Swans Tours, 1973); limits of causation, remoteness (Hadley; The Heron II, 1969) and mitigation (British Westinghouse, 1912).
• Where damages fail: unique goods or land; cost of cure versus loss of amenity (Ruxley v Forsyth, 1995); a third-party beneficiary who cannot sue (Beswick v Beswick, 1968, where specific performance was ordered).
• Equitable remedies (3.4.2): specific performance is discretionary and refused for personal services or where constant supervision is needed (Co-op Insurance v Argyll Stores, 1997); injunctions enforce negative terms (Warner Bros v Nelson, 1937) but not if they compel service (Page One Records v Britton, 1968); rescission is lost through affirmation or delay (Leaf v International Galleries, 1950).
• Conclusion: the statement is broadly right for commercial goods, but equity fills important gaps.

Where marks are usually lost

• Stating the postal rule but never deciding the date the contract was formed.
• Treating a minor’s contract as void rather than unenforceable against the minor.
• Applying CRA 2015 to a business-to-business sale.
• Essays that describe cases with no argument or conclusion; AO3 evaluation is 30% of Paper 3.

Frequently asked questions

How long should a 25-mark answer be? With 1 hour 30 minutes for three answers, allow about 28-30 minutes each. Plan the issues first, then write rule, authority, application and conclusion for each.

Do I need dates for cases? Dates are not required, but an accurate case name and what it decided are. Never cite a case you are unsure of; explain the principle instead.

Can one scenario test several strands? Yes. Question 2 shows how discharge, implied terms, exemption clauses and remedies can all appear in a single problem.

Official syllabus

Cambridge International AS & A Level Law (9084) syllabus for 2026, 2027 and 2028 - official syllabus PDF.