The Nineteenth Century, 1848–1914: Practice Questions

These are original questions written for Marlbridge, in the style and at the standard of the examination. They are not reproduced past-paper questions — examination boards hold copyright in their own papers. Use these alongside the official past papers available free from your board.

Related: The Nineteenth Century revision notes

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Section A

1. Give three causes of the 1848 revolutions in Europe. [3]

2. Name the key figures in the unification of Italy and state the role of each. [4]

Section B

3. Explain why the 1848 revolutions largely failed. [8]

4. Explain the role of Bismarck in the unification of Germany, referring to three wars. [9]

5. Explain the following causes of the First World War: the alliance system, militarism, and the crisis in the Balkans. [9]

6. “The First World War was caused primarily by the alliance system.” How far do you agree? [12]

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Answers

1. Any three: economic distress following poor harvests and the food shortages of the “hungry forties” [1]; demands for liberal constitutions and an extension of the franchise from the growing middle class [1]; nationalist demands for independence or unification, particularly in Italy, Germany and the Habsburg lands [1]; the example of the February revolution in France, which spread by imitation [1].

2. Mazzini — the ideological inspiration, founder of Young Italy, who promoted a republican vision of unity [1]. Garibaldi — the military leader whose Expedition of the Thousand conquered Sicily and Naples [1]. Cavour — Prime Minister of Piedmont, who provided the diplomatic strategy and the French alliance [1]. Victor Emmanuel II — King of Piedmont, who became the first king of a united Italy [1].

3. The revolutionaries were divided among themselves [1]: liberals wanted constitutional reform while radicals wanted a republic and social change, and once the initial concessions were won the middle classes withdrew rather than see the revolution go further [1] [1]. Nationalist movements conflicted with one another, as in the Habsburg Empire where Hungarian and Slav aspirations clashed [1]. Crucially, the armies remained loyal to their monarchs [1], so once the initial shock passed the rulers had the force to crush the risings [1]. Austria and Russia intervened to restore conservative order, notably in Hungary and Italy [1]. The revolutionaries also lacked the support of the peasantry, who returned to quiescence once feudal dues were abolished [1].

4. Bismarck pursued a policy of realpolitik, using war deliberately as an instrument to unite Germany under Prussian rather than Austrian leadership [1] [1]. The Danish War (1864) — Prussia and Austria jointly seized Schleswig and Holstein [1]; the joint administration was deliberately designed to create friction with Austria [1]. The Austro-Prussian War (1866) — Bismarck provoked the quarrel over the duchies into war [1]; the swift Prussian victory at Sadowa excluded Austria from German affairs and produced the North German Confederation under Prussian control [1]. The Franco-Prussian War (1870–71) — Bismarck used the Ems Telegram to provoke France into declaring war [1], which brought the southern German states in on Prussia’s side out of national feeling [1]; the German Empire was proclaimed at Versailles in January 1871 [1].

5. The alliance system divided Europe into two armed camps — the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente [1]; this meant a local quarrel could escalate into a general war, as obligations pulled each power in [1]; it also created a climate of suspicion in which every diplomatic move was read as hostile [1]. Militarism — the arms race, particularly the Anglo-German naval rivalry over dreadnoughts, raised tension and expenditure [1]; detailed war plans such as the Schlieffen Plan made rapid mobilisation essential [1], so once mobilisation began the timetable removed the room for diplomacy [1]. The Balkans — the decline of Ottoman power created a vacuum that Austria-Hungary and Russia both sought to fill [1]; Serbian nationalism, backed by Russia, threatened the multi-ethnic Habsburg Empire [1]; the assassination at Sarajevo in June 1914 gave Austria the pretext it wanted, and the alliance obligations did the rest [1].

6. Agreeing: the alliances converted an Austro-Serbian quarrel into a continental war [1]; Russia’s obligation to Serbia, Germany’s “blank cheque” to Austria and France’s commitment to Russia meant that no power could stay out [1]; the rigidity of the system removed the flexibility that had kept the peace since 1871 [1]. Disagreeing: the alliances were defensive in intent and had defused earlier crises — Morocco in 1905 and 1911, Bosnia in 1908 — without war, so they were not automatically fatal [1]. Militarism and the mobilisation timetables arguably mattered more: the Schlieffen Plan meant Germany had to attack France to fight Russia, which turned an eastern crisis into a western war [1] [1]. Nationalism in the Balkans supplied the actual spark and the underlying instability [1]. Imperial rivalry over colonies and markets had already poisoned relations [1]. Some historians emphasise individual decisions in July 1914 — Austrian determination to punish Serbia and German willingness to risk war — over structural causes [1]. Judgement: the alliance system was the mechanism by which a local war became a general one, but not its cause [1] [1]. Without the Balkan crisis there would have been nothing for the alliances to escalate, and without the mobilisation plans there would have been time to negotiate; the alliances are best seen as a necessary but not sufficient condition [1] [1].

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Where marks are usually lost

• Narrating events rather than explaining causes.
• Attributing German unification entirely to Bismarck’s planning.
• Listing causes of the war without linking them.
• Not reaching a supported judgement in the “how far” question.