A Level World History: International History, 1870-1945 — Revision Notes

Condensed for the final weeks. For the full explanation, use the International History, 1870–1945 study guide.

Where this fits

One of three AS options (European, American, International) — a school teaches one, not all three. Assessed via Paper 1 (document question) and Paper 2 (outline study), rotating which of the four topics is examined by which paper year on year — secure all four, don’t bet on one.

3.1 Empire and the emergence of world powers, 1870–1919

• New Imperialism: economic/political motives; domestic support/opposition in Britain, France, Germany.
• Impact on relations: disputes with China (Boxer Rebellion), Anglo-German tension over South Africa, Berlin Conference 1884–85 (managing imperial rivalry).
• Japan rising: modernisation, wars vs China (1894–95) and Russia (1905), 1902 treaty with Britain, WWI role.
• USA rising: closing frontier, overseas trade need, Spanish–American War (1898), WWI entry.

3.2 League of Nations & international relations, 1920s

• 1919–20 peace settlements: Versailles, Trianon, Neuilly, Saint Germain, Sèvres; reparations; Germany’s “Diktat.”
• 1920–23 high tension: Ruhr Crisis, Corfu Incident, German hyperinflation — despite Washington/Genoa Conferences, Rapallo Pact, Treaty of Lausanne.
• 1924–29 recovery: Dawes Plan, Locarno Treaties, Kellogg–Briand Pact, Young Plan.
• League itself: aims/membership/structure; collective security (Aaland Islands, Vilna, Upper Silesia); weaknesses; Agencies.

3.3 League of Nations & international relations, 1930s

• Rise of extremism: Great Depression’s impact on ideology, dictatorships, Spanish Civil War responses, Hitler’s expansion (rearmament, Rhineland 1936, Anschluss/Sudetenland 1938, Czechoslovakia/Poland 1939).
• League’s failure: failed disarmament, weak response to Manchuria and Abyssinia crises.
• Appeasement: British/French policy, shaped by economic/military factors and USSR relations — Rhineland, Anschluss, Munich Crisis.
• Outbreak of war, 1939: British rearmament, Polish guarantee, Nazi–Soviet Pact reasons, invasion of Poland.

3.4 China and Japan, 1912–45 — a parallel strand, not a continuation

• Warlord era (1916–27): disintegration under Yuan Shih-kai, May Fourth Movement, KMT growth under Sun Yat-sen (Three Principles), Northern Expedition.
• Chiang Kai-shek vs Communists (1927–36): Shanghai Massacre, Extermination Campaigns, Long March (1934–35), Xi’an Incident (1936).
• Why CCP gained support to 1945: Long March’s results, Mao’s leadership, Yan’an Soviet/land reform, impact of war with Japan post-1937, KMT’s declining popularity.
• Japan’s turn to military dictatorship: starting from its 1919 international status.

Worked example: tracing Japan across the option’s timeline

Japan is a genuinely useful thread to trace across the whole option, since it appears in both the European-centred narrative and 3.4’s parallel strand. In 3.1, Japan emerges as a new world power through rapid modernisation, victory over China (1894–95) and Russia (1905), a 1902 treaty with Britain, and a role in the First World War. By 3.4, the same country’s trajectory has shifted to a domestic turn toward military dictatorship in the 1930s, examined starting from its 1919 international status – the very point at which 3.1’s narrative of Japan’s rise effectively ends. Recognising Japan’s appearance in both topics as one continuous national story split across the syllabus’s own organisational structure (rather than two unconnected sets of facts about “Japan” that happen to share a name) is a useful way to build genuine synthesis across topics, which examiners reward in essay-style outline-study answers on Paper 2.

Connecting 3.2 and 3.3: from stabilisation to collapse

A common weak answer treats the 1920s and 1930s topics as two unrelated decades. A stronger answer explicitly traces how specific weaknesses left unresolved in 3.2 (the League’s limited use of collective security in disputes like the Aaland Islands, Vilna and Upper Silesia; its structural weaknesses as an institution) become directly relevant to explaining 3.3’s failures in the much higher-stakes Manchuria and Abyssinia crises – the League’s mechanisms did not fundamentally change between the two decades, but the scale and severity of the crises it faced did, exposing weaknesses that had already been present but less consequential in the 1920s.

Exam traps

• Folding 3.4 into the same timeline as 3.1–3.3 — the syllabus presents it as a parallel strand, not a continuation.
• Blurring the run of named treaties/conferences (Washington, Genoa, Rapallo, Locarno, Kellogg–Briand, Munich) into an undifferentiated list — anchor each to its specific key question.
• Concentrating revision on only the topics that seem “likely” for Paper 1 or Paper 2 — the specific topic-to-paper rotation changes year on year.
• Treating appeasement as simply “weakness,” rather than a policy shaped by specific economic, military and USSR-relations considerations.
• Confusing this option with the European or American AS options — different content entirely, and a school teaches only one.

Self-test

1. What are the three AS options, and how many does a school teach?
2. Name the four topics of the International Option.
3. Name two named treaties/conferences from the 1920s topic and what each responds to.
4. Why is 3.4 treated as a parallel strand rather than a continuation of 3.1–3.3?
5. Give one reason appeasement was pursued, beyond a simple desire to avoid war.
6. Why should a candidate secure knowledge of all four topics rather than concentrating on one or two?

Answers: 1. European (Modern Europe 1750–1921), American (USA 1820–1941), International; a school teaches one, not all three. 2. Empire and the Emergence of World Powers 1870–1919; The League of Nations and International Relations in the 1920s; The League of Nations and International Relations in the 1930s; China and Japan 1912–45. 3. E.g. the Dawes Plan (addressing German reparations payments) and the Locarno Treaties (addressing western European border security) — both part of the 1924–29 recovery. 4. Because it covers a substantively different region and set of actors (China and Japan) running in parallel to the European-centred narrative of 3.1–3.3, not a direct continuation of the same events. 5. Economic considerations (avoiding the cost of rearmament/war) or military considerations (Britain and France not yet being militarily prepared), or changing relations with the USSR. 6. Because Paper 1 and Paper 2 draw on the same four topics but rotate which is examined via document question versus outline study year on year, so concentrating on fewer than all four risks being unprepared for whichever combination actually appears.